What's In A Face-Save?
Trying to Make Sense of Today's Surreal U.S.-Israel-Iran-Qatar Exchanges
June 24, 12 AM
Iran’s Cinematic Attack On US Base In Qatar
There's something ironic about a country that (along with Iran), and despite being America’s ally, supported Hamas before its attack on Israel — being attacked by Iran in response to America's attack on Iran. But that's the Middle East for you.
Today, Iran launched a handful of missiles (the same number as the number of bombs dropped on Iran’s nuclear sites) at the massive US Al Ubeid base in the small Gulf state of Qatar. Qatar’s leadership was alerted beforehand, and passed the message on to the United States. For a moment, it looked like it might be the last lethal gesture of a sinking regime – but Iran apparently just wanted some domestic media footage of ‘giving the Western Satan a black eye."‘
The Qatar/American air defenses intercepted the missiles and apparently there were no casualties. Ever sensitive to Iran's need to save face with its own people, Trump then gave a shout out to Iran for warning Qatar and the US as to its intentions (perhaps he assumes it's lost in translation) — Then, a few hours later, the White House announced that Trump had brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, to take effect six hours later. Neither Israel nor Iran respond directly. Explosions continued to be heard in Tehran.
All of the above comes against the backdrop of a number of very relevant questions, such as: Did the US actually destroy Iran's enrichment facilities at the three hardened sites of Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. Trump insists it was all "obliterated", but a number of analysts aren’t so sure. And, where exactly is Iran's heavily enriched but not yet weapons-grade uranium? That’s a critical detail. Some of it was allegedly smuggled out of those facilities before the strikes as a precaution — and it stands to reason the regime, which isn’t stupid, would have done more.
There are also questions about where Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is – and whether the 86-year-old Ayatollah is indeed still in power after apparently naming a military command council (“Majles”) to handle the war. This raises the specter of an even harder-line military regime taking over from Iran's clerics. Israel, moreover, is saying it is nearly done with its sorties, as it bombs the entrance to such symbolic venues as Iran’s notorious Evin prison, where high-value political prisoners are kept.
A Strange Play
Where do things go from here? And what does Trump have in mind with this ceasefire that isn't – yet? The Iranian regime has absolutely no reason to trust Trump, particularly after his own highly effective fake outs. But Israel likely needs to recover from days of straight sorties. Presumably Iran needs a breather itself.
The problem with this march towards peace, is that Iran, while its conventional capacity has been flattened, may be even more dangerous than it was before the US bunker bombs, as they 1.) May have the material with which to create several bombs 2.), Are now much more motivated to do so fast, and 3.) Would move their program further into the shadows. As is, reports detail a number of clandestine facilities, and they may not know all of them.
Look To the Ones With Data
If there's some comfort, perhaps, it's that the Israelis clearly understand the risks of Iran's nuclear program better than anyone other than the Iranians themselves – if they're not sweating, perhaps there's a reason. Then again, Netanyahu is the same person who dropped the ball on security before the Hamas attack on 10/7. The US also doesn't seem to be sweating, but that’s a bit less reassuring, somehow.
One threat seems to be less likely today is that of Iran closing the Straits of Hormuz —something the Iranian Parliament, or Majles, voted to do yesterday. The fact that cash-starved Iran itsself depends on the funds from oil exported through the Straits, and further risks upsetting its customer China — along with a host of other powers — are reasons enough for the Islamic Republic to reconsider that.
The Conventional Wisdom
Many of the Iranian exiles I've spoken agree with commentator Karim Sadjadpour’s analysis, that the Iranian people are too concerned with survival at the moment to think about political protests, and that there’s a big risk that the clerical regime morphs into a military regime. But they also bristle at the idea that Iran shares too much in common with Iraq and Libya. There are, however, concerns that there is no clear opposition candidate around which Iranians might fully rally. The late Shah’s son Reza Pahlavi has his admirers —in not insignificant numbers — but some consider him to be too 'soft' to exercise the role that might be required of him (Pahlavi says he’s not seeking power, but to be a mediator). He’s certainly no Qassem Soleimani, the Al Quds Force Commander whose 2020 assassination in Baghdad Trump signed off.
Libya Has One Lesson To Give — And It’s Not The One You Might Think
What will happen next? First, the prospect of a cease fire holding is not very encouraging, even before it takes effect. The Qatar missiles episode and its concern with face saving, looks to be an important signal that the mullahs are equally concerned with internal unrest, as external bombs.
There’s been much made of the Lesson that the US allegedly taught Iran via its 2003 Deal with Libya, i.e., “if you give up your nuclear weapons, you will be toast.” There are some key differences between the Libya and Iran — one is that Iran actually has a nuclear weapons program, and Libya had a starter kit. The more relevant element is the fact that a deal with the US forced the regime to 'open up’ to a degree that ordinary Libyans could now see what they were missing, and organize. Ergo, the uprising of 2011, that precipitated the US military intervention that ultimately lead to Gaddafi’s death. And Ergo, Iran’s immediate focus on face-saving.
With a deeply dysfunctional economy under heavy sanctions, and no allies ready to back them up, and a people who are already taking off their chadoors and headscarves, it’s hard to see the the Iranian state ever being the same.
But it may take between a week and 7 years for the effects to be fully felt. What happens in the meanwhile is the problem.
The Middle East-Told Slant offers a non-partisan, practitioner's perspective on Middle East politics, conflict, and culture. Written by a former US diplomat, Senior Middle East Analyst, and author of "Benghazi: A New History" (Hachette, 2022) and the forthcoming "Red Sea: A History of the World's Most Volatile Waterway." To receive weekly posts and support this project, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I offer paid subscribers a complimentary copy of any of my books in print (equivalent to the cost of the subscription — DM me to redeem).