The Continuing Link Between Middle East Conflict and American Polarization

It's not going away anytime soon

In late 2022, I published a book called Benghazi: A New History, that detailed the long-tail origins of the 2012 Benghazi attack and scandal, and the ways in which both shaped the world we live in today.

As a Libya watcher and an eyewitness to parts of the attacks and its aftermath, I came to see the 3+ year brawl over Benghazi not as a political red-herring, but as an event deserving of careful study by anyone concerned about the future of the United States — and who wanted to assure divisive mega-scandals didn’t become a regular occurrence. As the domestic political war over the 10/7 Hamas attack on Israel (and the Israeli response) demonstrates, Middle East wars continue to provide rich fodder for the polarization of the American electorate.

In the book, I describe how two opposing, partisan “Benghazi narratives", one on the Left, one on the Right, fanned by the suddenly ultra-effective silo-creating capabilities of social media, created a melee that distracted from the underlying causes of the attack (an Al Qaeda plot to overthrow the transitional government in Libya, replace it with Islamist rule, and kick the Westerners out)* and hid its profound impact on American domestic politics and foreign policy.

I explained how the ever-present ghost of 9/11, combined with a highly effective use of media by the Right led the American Left into a state of indecision and risk aversion, in which the Obama administration studiously avoided mention of “Al Qaeda” and “terrorism” in connection with Benghazi (which some Republicans linked to identity politics).

The Right then used Left-wing circumambulations as a platform on which to build a series of increasingly outrageous claims, which took on added weight given a general lack of public trust in their government and the media. The result was two narratives: both extreme, incompatible, and at best, fractionally accurate.

In the end, the partisan political warfare around Benghazi paved the way for the election of Donald Trump, thereby changing the face of American political discourse, if not forever, then for the foreseeable future. Given the sheer amount of political sludge generated by Benghazi, it’s surprising to me, with what I know of those events, that many find this assertion surprising. How could three + years of partisan attacks NOT elevate polarization to a new high One senior Obama administration I interviewed off-record may have summarized it best: “Of course Benghazi was a major factor in Trump’s victory — all one has to do is take Clinton’s emails, and go on down the line….”, meaning, Benghazi was the common denominator for every other factor cited as a major contributor to the outcome, from the FBI investigation of Clinton’s emails, to the Russian cyber attacks, which further amplified Benghazi memes.

The topic ultimately so toxic that neither the Left nor Right had had any interest in a deeper post-mortem, relying instead on their respective Committee findings as a panacea [for a deeper look into the mechanics of the Republican-led Benghazi Committee, I recommend lead Committee investigator Bradley Podliska’s fascinating book, Fire Alarm, which details the failings of that Committee].

Israel-Palestine Comes Home:

The current American “discourse” on the War between Israel and Hamas (and its various backers) is not identical to that of Benghazi, of course, but it is alarmingly similar in some key respects. The most significant being the way Hamas’ 10/7 attack, and the Israeli (and American) response has once again helped polarize parts of the American electorate. Once again, social media has exacerbated the divide — Hamas deliberately used Social Media to shape Israel’s emotional reaction to its atrocities; while the Israeli government has also used Social Media to support and shape its own counter-attack narratives.

Back in the US, college campuses have become partisan battlegrounds, as the conflict splits the Left and Right, and Pro-Palestinian and Pro-Israel groups, accuse one another, variously, of “genocide”, “ethnic cleansing”, “Apartheid”, “Islamophobia”, “Arab-hating” and “Antisemitism.” Wide, concentric circles of “others” are appropriating the conflict and its vocabulary as their own.

This is problematic on a number of levels: The terms above have very specific legal and moral meanings, which often to not apply in the context in which they are used, and are thus inherently inflammatory. To give a more precise example: in the current war of words, one notices frequent and blatant elision, on all sides, of “actual war crimes” and “intent”. It’s pretty clear that there are many Israelis and Palestinians, in positions of influence, hold genocidal fantasies (i.e., ‘intent’) relative to the ‘other’, .But for the most part, they are not (thankfully) in a position to execute those intentions. Further, For me (and many others), the term “Antisemitism” has always had a more-than-semantic dissonance, when used within the context of the Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for the term Semitic literally applies to both Arabs and Jews, via “Shem”, son of Noah, a common ancestor to both. It’s also relevant, I think, that the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords (even thought PLO leader Yasser Arafat never signed a final agreement) substantiated the principle idea that, narratives aside, there are two people on the land and they need to find a way to live together. All of these are ways in which intensive focus on an “other” — whoever that is — as the sole problem, distracts, and polarizes.

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The main point, as far as America is concerned, is that the balance of antipathies, or domestic special interests (whatever they are) cannot be the hinge that determines which way US foreign policy swings. A stronger, more pragmatic “middle” needs to emerge, organically, to resist (and, engage) those who do not value free speech, and deal in chaos-sowing. The media’s traditional responsibility is to frame the moral contradictions and complexities of the issue— not to serve as conduits for, or placators to air-brushed creation and victimization narratives on both sides.

The American mainstream media, too, has stepped back from this role (even as other forms of media have tried to fill the void). The world needs to hear more about the sordid details of Islamist and Israeli politics, and outside states who enable extremists on both sides (particularly those who remain US allies), and the broad absence of long-term planning on the part of — pretty much all sides.

Biden, Between A Rock and A Hard Place:

But I fear what’s at stake here is much larger, the step-by-step dismantling of the United States influence, and by extension, the stability of the world order. For despite its battering, what other non-totalitarian power has the influence — to bring the world community together on issues of joint concern, other than America? And yet, this country is being eaten at from within, using ideological conflicts stoked by external elements, for this purpose.

Biden, the Democrats’ centrist candidate in 2020, has been, in equal measure, praised and condemned by Israel and Palestinian partisans for his “unswerving” support for Israel in the wake of the Hamas attack, and failure to curb Israel’s “disproportionate” military response. But whatever Biden’s personal views, domestic political calculations don’t give him much wiggle room. As Obama was after the Benghazi attack, Biden caught between implicit pressure by the Far Right to “out Israel” them (lest he be accused of weakness and political infidelity, once again), and the Far Left, whose leaders have been effectively calling for a challenger or under-vote in the 2024 election if Biden doesn’t put more pressure on Israel. All of this is happening in a soon-to-be-election-year, in which — once again — Donald Trump is waiting in the wings.

If divisions within and outside the Democratic party persist, it’s conceivable that Trump will be the beneficiary.  I fear another “Nader” moment, a reference to Green Party candidate Ralph Nader, who arguably split the vote for Al Gore, who then lost, officially, to George W. Bush by the thinnest of margins in 2000.

These dynamics are not going to disappear by themselves. This is an American problem to resolve.

If the American society is unable to create a more cohesive social and political fabric, external allies and adversaries (and conflicts) will continue to exploit our tribalism to generate internal disorder. At a Federal level, America will need to create a structures and processes that inoculate leadership against political blackmail, “scandal-harden” and depoliticize professional bureaucracies (particularly those related to national security and foreign policy); and create an environment in which high-quality intelligence and planning, trump populism and unqualified political appointments. Of course, one cannot cleanse foreign policy of politics — nor would one want to — but this is a question of degree.

Another necessity, at the level of community, civil society, government, and the media is the ability to effectively diffuse parochialism and tribalism, in favor of long-term collective interests and grand strategy. The obstacles are myriad: poor communication and leadership; prioritization of consumption over investment and of convenience over experience, expertise, and judgement; of technological advancement over regulation; of special interests over interests of the public; and excessive foreign influence on the levers of policy making. Here again, the media should be doing a better job of highlighting the fact that both the Benghazi attackers and Hamas were, and continue to be supported by some of America’s regional allies.

When Antony Blinken assumed the position of Secretary of State in 2021, he warned that the Trump administration had “gutted” the State Department so deeply that it would take generations to recover. While a powerful observation, this comment is also deceptively partisan, as it doesn’t take full stock of the problem — it assumes the Trump was the original and only factor in the erosion of US government professional bureaucracies, when in fact, Trump was always more of a symptom, then a cause. The most proximate cause of that bureaucratic erosion over the last 20 years has been American susceptibility to Middle East provocations, that then exacerbate unattended-to inequalities in income and power, within this country.

*The question of whether Al Qaeda’s formal proxies in Benghazi hoped for political damage on the United States, hasn’t been answered decisively, but the idea that successful attacks (and American reactions) impact American domestic politics, was one premise behind the original 9/11 attacks.