The Abraham Accords' Logic Stands: Tie The Edges Tightly To Heal The Center

Why faster, deeper regional integration - not retreat - remains the best strategy for Middle East peace

Drone’s eye view of the Jordan River’s (catastrophically reduced) input to the Dead Sea, c. 2019

I launched this blog in late Summer, 2023, not long before the 10/7 Hamas attack on Israel. At that time, the hope, if not expectation, was that the Trump-mediated Abraham Accords of 2020 would realize some of its deeper, promised economic and political returns, as a result of a pending Israel-Saudi peace deal. This next step might have taken place in October of 2023, had the Hamas attack on Israel not taken place. It is very likely that Iran, which according to the WSJ trained many of the Hamas commandos, facilitated the attack to take a larger, Arab-Israeli alliance against it, off the table.

Flash forward two years. Trump is back in office, and the devastating Israel-Gaza war is in its second year, with tens of thousands of Gazans dead, and the enclave reduced to rubble. Hamas still holds many Israeli hostages (how many remain alive is not known). Israel's attacks against Iran's proxies across the region have helped bring Iran to negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program.

All of this both strengthens and distracts from the purpose and promise of the Abraham Accords. But while the obstacles are great, a historic opportunity for peace and prosperity remains.

Trump's Black Box

Trump's ultimate intentions — and strategy— with respect to Israel-Gaza are not clear. Is he working towards a ‘grand plan’, explicitly modeled on the Abraham Accords, or is he looking for pockets of opportunity? He's spoken of a 'deal', that would end the war and return the hostages -- but the details that have gotten the most attention are certainly provocative — possibly, purposefully so.

• A "riviera" of luxury hotels, in place of rubble

• The possibility that a million or more Gazans could be resettled – permanently, or temporarily, it's not clear -- in places like Libya, which is still in the throes of a civil war, or Somaliland, which is seeking US recognition as a state independent of the war-torn Somalia

On the other hand, at the start of his second term Trump also effectively told the regional players – Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, that he's expecting a regional plan to emerge from them -- even as he's fixed on a deal with Iran, that may or may not resemble the Iran Deal from which Trump withdrew in 2018. Egypt floated an 'Arab plan', but it was rejected by other Gulf states, because it left Hamas intact in Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's failure to engage on a deal to end the violence in Gaza, and insistence on trying to disrupt US-Iran negotiations, seem to have taken Israel outside Trump's good graces - for the moment.

But the lingering moral morass has heightened the danger that the continuing war in Gaza will cause the US and its Gulf Allies to skip over the Palestinian-Israeli problem for the foreseeable future, in favor of more achievable near-term, bilateral wins.

The Abraham Accords' Achilles Heel

The 2020 Abraham Accords were an inspired gamble – flip the all or nothing approach to Arab-Israeli peace, and pursue interactions between Arabs and Israelis that, over time, would build a network of interactions and trust, that would reduce more localized animosities between Palestinians and Israelis. The fusing of Gulf capital and Israeli tech was the central mechanism for creating a tide that would ‘lift all ships’.

The 'flaw' was well known at the time of creation: the Palestinians weren't directly a party to the deal between Israel, the UAE and the US (and later Sudan, Bahrain and Morocco), and were thus in a position to argue that they'd been sold down the river, with prospects for a Palestinian state now more remote than close. It’s not at all clear how that flaw might have been addressed at the time, in a way that would have allowed the deal to move forward.

But the deal as it was, created perceptions and 'incitations' to violence, which manifested themselves three years later, on 10/7/23: Hamas' meticulously planned murder and hostage spree was designed to create leverage by drawing the easily / willingly-baited Netanyahu into a massacre and perversely- hoped-for public relations morass in Gaza. What Hamas didn't bargain for was the extent to which Netanyahu was willing to oblige – and the extent to which the broader international community was willing to stand by and watch the conflict grow.

At the same time, the sheer scale of the Gaza disaster – and Israel's ability to use the provocation to tame, if not decapitate, Iran's major regional proxies – has changed perceptions. (NYT columnist Thomas Friedman, who has been an outspoken supporter of the Abraham Accords, for example, seemed to have given up on a two state solution prior to 10/7, but the scope of change caused him to advocate a bigger play.)

An Abraham 2.0, would need to be premised on plunging deeper into the Abraham logic, and focused on deals that involved and directly benefited the Palestinians — not their, or Israel's perverse leadership. None of this will be easy.

Deals On the Table

The premise driving the Abraham Accords was that proximity and interdependence between Israel and other Arab countries would ultimately create the trust that is required to suture the open wound that is the Israeli-Palestinian problem. The implicit message to the Palestinians -- and Israelis -- was "wait, and you shall see results." And results started to emerge.

Project Prosperity

One was Project Prosperity, according to which Jordan would build, with Emirati investment, a 600 MW solar power grid on its territory. Israel, in turn, would use the power to feed expanded desalination capacity on the Mediterranean. Israel’s water carrier would pump billions of gallons of fresh water back into the Jordan river, alleviating dire water constraints on Jordan and the Territories, while regenerating the Jordan River.

Project Prosperity emerged from a "Green Blue Deal" concept put forth by the joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian NGO, EcoPeace.

The India-Middle East Economic Corridor

Another far more expansive and complex, but relevant initiative is the India-Middle East Economic Corridor, which envisions, at first, Israel to be a key node in a new, multi-modal trade corridor linking India with the Gulf and Europe.

EcoPeace responded to this notion with the idea of the "Peace Triangle" – a spur that would create an outlet to the trade at Gaza – including a major desalination facility that would feed both Gaza and the Territories. Gaza, in other words, would be developed within the IMEC, and its 5000-year historical role as a transshipment corridor linking East and West.

The UAE, in particular, could be a key player here, as it has had direct experience developing smaller states as transshipment hubs. The most relevant case here is that of the 'micro-state' of Djibouti, in which logistics capabilities were married with high-efficiency port management and business-class amenities –for which an analogy can be drawn to Trump's more crudely put "riviera."

All of the above constitutes an elaborate infrastructure play that draws the states in the region together so closely, conflict will be difficult to sustain.

The IMEC: “Child of the Abraham Accords”

Trump superficially might not like the IMEC, given the Biden Administration’s support for it at the G20 in 2023. But as one US diplomat noted in 2023, the IMEC is the "child of the Abraham Accords:" a high-tech, multi-modal trade corridor linking the Subcontinent to Europe via the Gulf would not have been possible without peace — or the prospect of wider diplomatic and economic relations — between Israel and the Gulf states.

Critically, the IMEC has been framed, at least in the West and India, if not in the Gulf, as a direct competitor to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-- a system of infrastructure investments supporting China's export economy – something that Trump presumably also favors.

I am in no way downplaying the practical impediments to implementing the above projects. This collective vision of regional peace requires sustained political push by multiple governments, across multiple regulatory environments – at levels that are by no means assured.

High Hurdles To Clear

First: Speak to the Israeli Public/ Shape Israel's Behavior

The United States would need to exercise its unique diplomatic power and influence to change Israel's (i.e., Netanyahu and his far-right coalition) behavior, quickly, and dramatically, in return for movement on the other side — most notably, a release of all remaining Israeli hostages.

While the US President can't order the Israelis to dump their Prime Minister, he can offer a combination of carrots and sticks that may have the same effect. Eisenhower's response to the UK, France and Israeli attack on the Suez Canal in 1956 is a relevant precedent, of a US President stopping an aggression in progress — but these are different times, and the US domestic political environment may simply not allow it, even if it's in Israel's own direct interest.

Second: Include The Hamas Problem in Iran/Qatar Negotiations

Trump would need to include directly the issue of Hamas’ disposition in negotiations with Iran and Qatar – and make those states understand that there would be no future deals with them, if they did not convince Hamas to release the remaining hostages, and leave Gaza (presumably to Qatar, which has been Hamas' patron for decades, and also enabled the 10/7 attack).

The US has positive and negative leverage with both of these countries: the US has provided Qatar with a de facto military shield, via two major US military bases on Qatari soil, since shortly after the first Gulf War – those bases could be drawn down, or removed — or the relationship could be further strengthened.

Iran's help in resolving the crisis it helped stoke between Israel and Gaza could explicitly be incentivized in negotiations over its nuclear program. Here too, there are domestic political concerns – and complications — Trump just accepted a 300 million dollar plane from the government of Qatar as a gift.

Third: Present a Complete Palestinian State Vision

Trump would need to present a complete vision for a Palestinian state, that engages the Palestinian people directly, while isolating the extremists that exert substantial influence over them. This process would logically start with Gaza, hence the occasionally-heard "Gaza first" terminology.

If a fraction of the Palestinians need to be relocated while a multinational reconstruction effort is underway, they must be given iron clad promises that they will be able to return – not just to Gaza – but to Gaza as a part of the first US-recognized Palestinian state, and to hold a share in that new polity and economy.

The Palestinians have a major, and largely untapped resource — a highly educated diaspora. This isn't the place to get into the details of possible governance frameworks (I've done that in previous posts), but there are multiple examples of technology being used progressively, rather than regressively, to give voice to "ordinary people", and establish political legitimacy.

Why Trump Might Actually Pursue This

One hopes that Trump and his advisors will, for whatever combination of reasons, lean into the original innovation, which is indelibly tied to Trump himself – the Abraham Accords – rather steer than away from it.

In an Abraham 2.0, Trump still has a chance to do what no other world leader has managed to do: settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And, for all else, it would establish Trump in a particular class of "master dealmakers" — a status that may appeal to him more than many other things.

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Coming Up: A Deep Dive with EcoPeace

In my next post, I'll be sharing insights from my upcoming podcast conversation with Gidon Bromberg, Israel Director of EcoPeace – the Israel-Palestinian-Jordanian organization behind the concepts driving Project Prosperity and the "Peace Triangle”. We'll explore how environmental cooperation can create the foundation for lasting peace, and whether these infrastructure projects can actually work in practice.

What are your thoughts on this energy-nexus, outward-in approach to reshaping regional dynamics? Will creating deeper resource inter-dependencies be enough prevent war? Or are the political obstacles simply too formidable?

Share this post if you think others should be considering these possibilities, and subscribe to follow this analysis as events continue to unfold.

The Middle East-Told Slant offers a non-partisan, practitioner's perspective on Middle East politics, conflict, and culture. Written by a former US diplomat, Senior Middle East Analyst, and author of "Benghazi: A New History" (Hachette, 2022) and the forthcoming "Red Sea: A History of the World's Most Volatile Waterway." To receive weekly posts and support this project, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I offer paid subscribers a complimentary copy of any of my books in print (equivalent to the cost of the subscription — DM me to redeem).