More on the 9/11 Trap

Written 10/17

Last Updated 10/19

As a preface, I understand the sensitivities and nuances of this topic. Many will disagree with what I say here. These are my opinions, based on my personal experiences. I’m open to measured discussion, preferably those that don’t begin with long historical recitations —from which, once started, it’s almost impossible to recover. There is a time and a place for those.

I have spent most of my 25-year career working on and across the Middle East, from Tunisia to Yemen. I am not a “deep specialist” in the Arab-Israeli conflict, per se, but I have been directly exposed to its many phases over those years, and had a privileged view of some of its low- and high-points (notably, the signing of the Jordan peace accords of 1994, and the Abraham Accords of 2020). I have heard and read just about every conceivable argument related to the conflict. Perhaps most relevant, I spent the better part of a decade charting for a recently-published book the roots and unintended consequences of “both” 9/11s — the original 2001 attacks on NY and Washington, and the politically occluded “Other 9/11”- the Benghazi attacks, also supported, if not even directly ordered, by Al Qaeda.

My first reaction to the Hamas slaughter of 1500 people — mostly Israelis — other than being sick to my stomach, was to hope that Israel would not fall into the “9/11 trap”: Reflexive actions that feed the ideologies that motivated the attack (and retroactively justify them in the eyes of those that espouse — or are prone to espouse them in the future). As noted Middle East scholar Robert Springborg opined years ago, “the US would have been infinitely better off had it treated 9/11 as a mass criminal act, rather than a call to an ideology-and-dogma-laced frenzy.” In its blood-lust the Bush administration gave Al Qaeda far more than it dreamed possible.

In this case, Israel’s argument regarding the need to project ‘strength’ seems axiomatic to many. But if Israel’s leaders and friends are truly concerned about Israel’s future — they’ll collaborate to re-establish restraint, while pushing international mediation. As distasteful as this idea is to many, I believe this is the only way out. The “not wanting to reward terrorists through negotiating” argument is just as suspect here as the “deterring Hamas by destroying it” claim. As others have pointed out, deterrence does not tend to work as well in asymmetric warfare.

I believe I understand —as much as a non-Israeli, non-Palestinian can — the emotions behind the Israeli response, and the collective Arab rage at its consequences. Both sets of videos — those from the attack, and those from Gaza — are gut-wrenching, in similar, and also very different ways. The scale and savagery of the Hamas attack can’t be justified by an appeal to an accumulation of past suffering. Israeli actions (particularly under Netanyahu) to destroy the 2-state solution are unconscionable. These are two separate, but obviously linked, moral failures.

I am dismayed by the effusions of hate coming from people with passing familiarity with the conflict (“screamers” as some have started to call them), who feel the need to attach their own very separate causes and needs to one side or other, adding to the general ambiance of hate. I see these as yet another symptom of 9/11-accelerated domestic divisions (see an excellent column by Frank Bruni in the NYT).

It’s a common speculation that Hamas didn’t expect to be so ‘successful’ in its attack - that it planned to be constrained by a swift Israeli response, and found a giant security lapse instead. Those lapses appear to have been real, but the other argument makes little sense, mainly because the attack reeks intentionality - and by that, I mean the desire to generate the maximum emotional response from Israel, and the Israeli public. Go-Pros and Facebook uploads were evidence enough of this. No need to cite any other atrocities to establish this. Which means that Hamas expected a massive response. And large civilian casualties.

I hear those who argue that Israel had no choice but to respond with overwhelming force — that the atrocities must be punished; that Hamas must be destroyed, so this will never happen again. But would anyone familiar with this dynamic (as the Israelis surely are) really believe chasing down and killing every member of Hamas — as if that were even possible — means it’s over? Or that Israelis can now breathe easy, in the knowledge they’ve deterred other such attacks?

One of the most basic lessons is that extremists — on whatever side — gain strength from starting and propagandizing un-winnable wars. Israel may kill everyone involved in the attack, but in doing, they’ll plant similar degrees of hatred in an umpteen more, and while there may be a short term coming together, ultimately the Israeli reaction will likely split the country further: As one Israeli friend recently told me, “It already feels like Israel’s splitting apart.” The two 9/11’s exacerbated that same trend in the United States, with a big help from social media.

So, even though it’s satisfying to lash out, does this really protect Israel in the longer term — or make things worse?

Israel was likely in the neighborhood of a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia, within a year or so. In the context of an increasing number of such arrangements, all of which would presumably make Israel safer, and help foster an environment in which a two state solution might be resurrected. Where does that lie?

Israel hasn’t invaded Gaza yet. Maybe there’s an invisible hand working to shape a short period of strong talk and a military onslaught into a deal to release the hostages and jump start peace talks, aided by Egypt, for example - or, who knows, even Qatar. Somehow, it seems unlikely. That would require a degree of self-awareness and political freedom that may simply not exist at the moment. It feels as if the Israeli - and US - and also broader Arab - response is too deeply linked to respective domestic and regional politics to be so flexible.

For years the US went stark raving mad, overturning countries on false premises, engaging in state-backed torture, creating political vacuums — within a matter of geological nanoseconds destroying an outpouring of international sympathy and goodwill. The cost has been enormous — to our own security, organizational capacity in intelligence and foreign policy, domestic division and regional stability.

Moreover, for its part, the US media seems to under-weight who stands to benefit most from this conflict — and who loses. I was heartened to read General Petraeus voice in Foreign Policy voice the same caution to Israel not to repeat America’s post-9/11 mistakes. Iran wins — no more parallel peace process that shuts them out and boxes it in. the Jihadist cause wins — infinite propaganda material. America’s other adversaries win — America’s stock and influence is publicly challenged. Russia wins — for a variety of reasons, practical and ideological.

“In crisis comes opportunity,” or so they say. I believe the war does (or did) offer opportunities — which are slipping away by the hour. The UAE managed to de-escalate the Trump-era US-backed Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, by offering a very attractive incentive to moderation. I was at first vaguely hoping this logic could be replicated - with active US assistance. But that opportunity may have disappeared — with a hospital bombing that may have been Israel’s doing, or Islamic Jihad’s (these things happen in wars).

The question should at least be asked, whether the United States actually supports Israel by public pronouncements, or whether it would be helping Israel by applying ‘lessons learned?’ from 9/11, and doing its best to end the active conflict, as soon as possible, with a vision in hand to advance the real gains made over the last few years? I also recognize that for President Biden, it’s not so simple politically. Whatever the nuance of his thinking, the President’s actions are shaped by the domestic environment in which he’s swimming, including pressure to support Israel stronger than the strongest voice on the Right, lest he be charged with “weakness” in the 2024 campaign.

The best possible international effort needs to be made to stop the war in Gaza. Quickly. And for the simple reason that this isn’t a war that can be won with munitions. The international community needs to credibly commit fast-track a solution that provides Palestinians — and Israelis — both, hope for a humane and prosperous future. With everything else going on in the world today, none of us — including average Americans — can afford the cost of a prolonged Israel-Palestinian conflict or a multi-front Middle East War. And here’s another lesson for US policy makers: There is no such thing as “pivoting” away from the Middle East, before some kind of relative stability is achieved. Because as history has shown, the Middle East has infinite capacity to draw us back in, again and again, each time taking a pound of flesh. The future of the United States and its own democracy is not solely determined by what happens in the Middle East, but the road passes directly through it.