Iran & Co.'s Calculus of Restraint
The more criticism Israel draws to itself, the less incentive its enemies have to join the fight.
The question on the minds of many in the last few days is whether and when Israel campaign in Gaza will open new fronts with Iran’s many proxies, specifically, the formidable Hezbollah forces in Lebanon — which might draw external powers into the war.
As has been amply pointed out, if any of these groups had wanted, or planned, to enter the fray the most opportune moment was right after the 10/7 terror attack that killed 1300 Israelis, as Hamas exploited the element of surprise. That didn’t happen. Since, the U.S. has provided a naval deterrent to Hezbollah, and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.
But the most significant factor in ‘Shi’a restraint’ is most certainly the fact that rapidly-rising Palestinian civilian casualties are generating unprecedented amounts of sympathy for the Palestinians — as well as broad anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish sentiment. Israel’s enemies couldn’t produce better propaganda material if they tried — (wait, they did). A fourth constraint may be an Iranian fear that Israel may use the 10/7 attack, and the US’ strong support, to launch an attack on its nuclear program, during a critical phase in its development.
In the first few weeks after the 7/10 terror attack by Hamas that killed 1300 Israelis, Israel had a monopoly on global sympathy, as the United States did after 9/11. Israel quickly spent this broader sympathy with its relentless bombing in Gaza that, while it no doubt killed Hamas operatives and leaders, has also killed more than 8000 Palestinian civilians, a third of them children. While the origins of the explosion that killed hundreds at Gaza's Al Ahli Hospital are still disputed, the expansion of Israel’s attacks are, as expected, also causing civilian deaths in other zones, or by means (cutting off water and food to civilians) considered by almost all standards out-of-bounds in war. Most recently, an Israeli strike within the Jabalia refugee camp in Northern Gaza allegedly killed one of the masterminds of the 10/7 attack, but killed “scores” of civilians at the same time.
From the perspective of Israel’s regional enemies, as long as the gradient of anti-Israel sentiment is rising rapidly, they’re winning. They have no need to do anything other than what they've done so far— and put in a token effort to ‘save face’ and keep the Israeli military’s eyes on other fronts: On October 31 the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen fired another salvo of drones and ballistic missiles from the Southern Red Sea towards Israel. These were easily downed by Israeli fighter jets and a US destroyer based in the Red Sea.
Hamas’ goal with the 10/7 attack was most likely to scuttle the prospect of a Saudi-Israel rapprochement. Iran may or may not have known about this or given an order in advance, but it is highly unlikely Iran desires to get pulled into an all out regional war which, for one, increases the possibility of another revolt at home. Further, any direct intervention by Iran may encourage counter-strikes designed to roll back its assumed “breakout capacity” (levels of enriched uranium that enable a quick dash to a viable nuclear weapon). Iran may in fact be hoping that by keeping a relatively low profile in the face of a long Israeli land campaign in Gaza, it can quietly cross over the line into the nuclear club, while further deepening its ties to Russia and China.
For years, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has called Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon an existential threat to Israel, and used Iran’s nuclear progress to advocate action against Iran within American government circles. The Biden administration has also declined to push as strongly as some expected for Iran’s return to the 2015 JCPOA (“Iran Deal”), and to remove the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) from the US terror list on which President Trump placed it in 2019, without prior concessions. But this certainly does not mean the Biden administration is actively seeking confrontation with Iran.
In an interesting editorial choice, Ha’aretz, Israel’s most established left-leaning newspaper, carried a piece by controversial Israeli journalist Benny Morris, who argues ‘now is the best time’ for an Israeli strike on Iran. The motive behind publishing this piece now, may be to highlight the risks of such a move (including Russia and China’s entry into the conflict), or to remind Iranian officials that this thought — however dangerous — is certain to be on the minds of the Israeli government, the Biden administration, and prominent outside advisors.
The above factors may help explain why broader conflict hasn’t broken out yet, but they are of limited predictive use, as Israel continues its quest to annihilate Hamas. In such a volatile environment, there are many actions, whether intentional or accidental, that could draw others into the fray — against their interests.